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1.  Introduction: A double-dip recession? 
The risk of a double-dip recession in the eurozone has been increasing during the last few 
months. Figure 1 shows the growth rate of GDP in the eurozone. It can be seen that after a 
recovery from the deep recession of 2008-09, the eurozone’s GDP growth has been turning 
again into negative territory since the second part of 2012.   
The  renewed  decline  in  the  growth  rates  of  GDP  in  the  eurozone  has  the  effect  of 
automatically increasing the government budget deficits and putting pressure on national 
governments to avoid an increase in these deficits. As a result, fiscal policies are tightened 
even further. The risk is that pro-cyclical budgetary policies will push the 2013 growth rates 
of GDP firmer into negative territory, leading to a full-fledged double-dip recession. 
Figure 1. Growth of GDP in the eurozone 
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Why  has  the  eurozone  been  moving  towards  a  double-dip  recession?  This  commentary 
advances the hypothesis that this has to do with the asymmetric structure of macroeconomic 
adjustments in the eurozone. After having developed this hypothesis, it turns to the question 
of how to avoid a double-dip recession. 
2.  Asymmetries in macroeconomic adjustments in the eurozone 
It is no exaggeration to state that macroeconomic policies in the eurozone have been very 
much  driven  by  sentiments  in  financial  markets.  Some  countries  (mainly  the  southern 
European  countries)  have  been pushed  into  bad  equilibria  characterised  by  high  interest 
rates  and  intense  pressures  to  redress  budget  deficits  by  intense  austerity  programmes. 
Other countries (mainly northern European countries) have gently been pushed into good 
equilibia, characterised by historically low interest rates and the relative comfort that can be 
derived  from  them.  The  southern  European  countries  (including  Ireland)  are  also  the 
economies  that  have  accumulated  current  account  deficits,  while  the  northern  European 
countries have built up current account surpluses.  
The first best policy would have been for the debtor countries to reduce and for the creditor 
countries to increase spending. Instead, under the leadership of the European Commission, 
tight austerity was imposed on the debtor countries while the creditor countries continued to 
follow policies aimed at balancing the budget. This has led to an asymmetric adjustment 
process in which most of the adjustment has been done by the debtor nations. The latter 
countries have been forced to reduce wages and prices relative to the creditor countries (an 
‘internal  devaluation’)  without  compensating  wage  and  price  increases  in  the  creditor 
countries (‘internal revaluations’). Figures 2 and 3 graphically illustrate these trends.  
Figure 2. Relative unit labour costs in Greece, Portugal, Spain, Italy and Ireland 
 (average 1970-2010=100) 
 
Source: European Commission, AMECO. 
Figure  2  shows  the  evolution  of  the  relative  unit  labour  costs  of  the  peripheral  debtor 
countries (where we use the average over the 1970-2010 period as the base period). Two 
features stand out. First, from 1999 until 2008-09, one observes the strong deterioration of 
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of the relative unit labour costs have occurred (internal devaluations) in Ireland, Spain and 
Greece, and to a lesser extent in Portugal and Italy. 
These  internal  devaluations  have  come  at  a  great  cost  in  terms  of  lost  output  and 
employment in the debtor countries. As these internal devaluations are not yet completed 
(except possibly in Ireland), more losses in output and employment are to be expected. 
Is  there  evidence  that such  a process  of  internal  revaluations  is going  on  in  the surplus 
countries? The answer is given in Figure 3, which presents the evolution of the relative unit 
labour  costs  in  the  creditor  countries.  We  observe  that  since  2008-09,  there  is  very  little 
movement in these relative unit labour costs in these countries. The position of Germany 
stands out. During 1999-2007, Germany engineered a significant internal devaluation that 
contributed to its economic recovery and the build-up of external surpluses. This internal 
devaluation stopped in 2007-08. Since then no significant internal revaluation has taken place 
in Germany. We also observe from Figure 3 that the other countries remain close to the long-
run equilibrium (the average over 1970-2010) and that no significant changes have taken 
place since 2008-09. 
Figure  3.  Relative  unit  labour  costs  in  Belgium,  the  Netherlands,  Austria,  France, 
Finland and Germany (average 1970-2010=100) 
 
Source: European Commission, Ameco. 
Figure  4  shows  a  similar  asymmetry  in  the  adjustment  process  of  current  account 
imbalances. We show the current account positions of the surplus and deficit countries. We 
observe the significant deterioration of the current account position of the deficit countries 
during  the  ‘bubble  years’  followed  by  an  equally significant  improvement  in  the  current 
account position. No such movements are observed in the surplus countries leading to the 
conclusion that most of the adjustment in the external imbalances within the eurozone has 
been made by the peripheral deficit countries.  
From the preceding analysis, one can conclude that the burden of the adjustments to the 
imbalances in the eurozone between the surplus and the deficit countries is borne almost 
exclusively by the deficit countries in the periphery. This asymmetry produces a deflationary 
bias  in  the  eurozone  as  a  whole.  Yet  it  could  be  done  differently.  A  more  symmetric 
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Figure 4. Current account (deficits) in the eurozone 
 
Source: European Commission, AMECO. 
3.  How to avoid a double-dip recession 
A  symmetric  approach  should  start  from  the  different  fiscal  positions  of  the  member 
countries of the eurozone. This difference is shown in Figures 5 and 6, which present the 
government  debt  ratios  of  two  groups  of  countries  in  the  eurozone,  the  debtor  and  the 
creditor countries. One observes from these figures that while the debtor countries have not 
been able to stabilise their government debt ratios (in fact, these are still on an explosive 
path), the situation of the creditor countries is dramatically different. With the exception of 
France, the latter set of countries has managed to stabilise these ratios. This opens a window 
of  opportunity  to  introduce  a  rule  that  can  contribute  to  more  symmetry  in  the 
macroeconomic policies in the eurozone. 
Here is the proposed rule. The creditor countries that have stabilised their debt ratios should 
stop  trying  to  reduce  their  budget  deficits  further  now  that  the  eurozone  is  entering  a 
double-dip recession. Instead they should stabilise their government debt ratios at the levels 
they have achieved in 2012. The implication of such a rule is that these countries can run 
small  budget  deficits  and  yet  keep  their  government  debt  levels  constant.  Germany,  in 
particular, which today has almost achieved a balanced budget, could increase its budget 
deficit to close to 3% while keeping its ratio of debt to GDP constant. Other creditor countries 
– Belgium, Netherlands, Finland and Austria – could be urged to stop adding new austerity 
measures without leading to an increase in their debt-to-GDP ratios.  
Whether such a rule will be implemented very much depends on the European Commission. 
The latter should invoke exceptional circumstances, i.e. the start of a recession that is hitting 
the whole eurozone and threatens to undermine the stability of the eurozone, and urge the 
creditor countries to temporarily stop trying to balance their budgets. As an alternative rule, 
the European Commission should convince the creditor countries that it is in both their and 
the eurozone’s interest that they stabilise their government debt ratios instead.  HOW TO AVOID A DOUBLE-DIP RECESSION IN THE EUROZONE | 5 
 
The more symmetric budgetary policies advocated here would go some way in reducing the 
deflationary  bias  that  has  been  instilled  in  the  macroeconomic  policies  pursued  in  the 
eurozone since the start of the debt crisis, and that threaten to push the eurozone as a whole 
into a double-dip recession.  
Figure 5. Gross government debt ratios in creditor countries of the eurozone 
 
Source: European Commission, AMECO. 
Figure 6. Gross government debt ratios in debtor countries of the eurozone 
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